The mind-body relationship in psychotherapy: grounded cognition as an explanatory framework
philosophers are not overawed by the mind-body problem; instead, it is the color- body problem that is widely of this conversion Indeed, McGinn′ thinks .. The final section takes up the question of the relation between the two problems. Conversion Disorder— Mind versus Body: A Review .. conflict and the physical symptoms once they are able to recognize the connection. ://fabula-fantasia.info Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-tr%20to%20dsmpdf. between mind and body, the mind–body split is still a dominant position for families and health care . Reciprocal Relation between Parents and Children .. Kozlowska, K. Good children presenting with conversion disorder.
Consider the act of scratching your head In strictly scientific terms, this should not be possible. It is a purely subjective decision. It involves the philosophy of two different kinds of substance: From a materialistic viewpoint that should be impossible Descartes believed that in this case, mind influences body 10 Mind-Brain Debate Bit of a problem, eh?
No value — unless it can bring about changes in behaviour. Subjective experience says — mind does affect behaviour — try scratching your head! Biological evolution has been for survival value. We can assume that mind and body have evolved together for some reason because we have survived! Descartes 16 Humphrey disagrees with Descartes.
It is not part of the objective world. It is not physical 18 PAIN From the fact that there is no accompanying brain activity, we could say that my brain-based pain belongs nowhere else than in the world of physical material. It is, after all, nothing other than a physical event. So, my pain — that is, my experience of pain — depends wholly on brain activity.
Somehow, between neural transmission and experience, there is a conversion. We propose that grounded cognition provides such a framework. Grounded cognition has been comprehensively articulated and critiqued in the literature Barsalou, has a strong empirical foundation e.
Thus, each according to their bodily experiences with morels forms different conceptualizations of it. However, these concepts are not determinate: Furthermore, it is important to note that there is nothing stopping Sally, Charles, and Lucy from having the same concept for a morel, it is simply their differing bodily interactions with the morel which has determined their conceptualizations. Finally, it can be assumed that they have the same visual conceptualization of a morel; they all know one when they see it.
However, if Lucy were to have been born blind, she would never be able to obtain the same concept of a morel as Sally and Charles. In sum, grounded cognition implies that cognition is emergent from and inextricably tied to the subjective, lived, experience of the body-in-the-world. Conceiving of the relationship between body and mind from this holistic, psychological perspective can be expected to have a number of important implications for psychotherapy theory and practice.
When the mind—body relationship is conceptualized from a dualist or exclusivist perspective, a tension is created between the phenomenological needs of the patient who is present mind and body and the emphasis on either mind or body according to the theoretical assumptions of the psychotherapy practiced by the therapist.
One example of this is the de-emphasis of the body during the practice of psychotherapies whose underlying theory disembodies the mind. During such therapies e. Second, a psychologically articulated, holistic framework for the mind—body relationship encourages theoretical reflection about this relationship by challenging dualist and exclusivist assumptions inherent in some psychotherapies. In turn, this helps to clarify some of the points of difference between the psychotherapies described above.
An example of this is traditional behavioral therapy and body psychotherapy. Both emphasize the body and conceptualize it as the agent of change and as a consequence, both prioritize the body in therapy.
One of the primary differences between the two can be ascertained by reflecting on the mind—body relationship. Traditional behavior therapy is very much exclusivist, dismissing the mind and cognition and emphasizing the body and behavior, both methodologically and theoretically.
Contrastingly, body psychotherapy recognizes cognitions whilst treating them via the body, thus implying a holistic conceptualization of mind and body.
Conversion Disorder— Mind versus Body: A Review
Third, a holistic conceptualization of the mind—body relationship has the potential to further de-stigmatize mental illness Thomas, ; Ungar and Knaak, ab. Ungar and Knaak a suggest that dismissive and blaming attitudes toward mental health issues can be attributed to the absence of an organic explanation for most mental health issues. Thomas suggests that promoting mental illness to non-psychiatric health professionals as an interaction between cognitive, behavioral, emotional, biological, and environmental factors would reduce dualistic thinking around mental health issues and help with de-stigmatization in these settings.
Thus, we propose that the holistic conceptualization of the mind—body relationship presented here will further help with de-stigmatization of mental illness in non-psychiatric settings. Fourth, the clearly articulated, explicit position of a holistic mind—body portrayed by grounded cognition encourages a more reflective approach to the issue in practice.
Theories underlying most current psychotherapies do not explicitly state their position regarding the relationship between mind and body. Consequently, practitioners unreflectively adopt the assumptions inherent in the psychotherapies they utilize. The clear articulation of a holistic mind—body from both phenomenological and objective perspectives may assist practitioners to reflect on this relationship.
The issue for psychotherapy practice is that in using these labels with patients, they automatically divide psychopathologies into arbitrary categories and thus portray dualist or exclusivist agendas. This is but one example of changes which may come of reflecting on the mind—body relationship in practice. Finally, a new perspective on the mind—body relationship will guide the identification of gaps in existing therapies and consequently promote an expansion of the range of therapies offered to the patient.
For example, grounded cognition implies that one way to change cognitions is through the subjective, lived, bodily experience of the individual. Encouraging practitioners to reflect on a holistic mind—body approach may result in a wider range of therapies they can offer their patients stemming from this idea. Further development of these ideas may also result in the creation of new and innovative therapeutic methods to augment those already in existence.
By reviewing how mind and body are traditionally understood in major psychotherapies, we have attempted to underscore some of the tensions in this area. By introducing and outlining grounded cognition as a holistic psychological approach consistent with both radically subjectivist Merleau-Ponty and objectivist Dewey philosophical approaches, we hope to have proposed a new way forward for theorists and practitioners of psychotherapy.
This new way forward throws light on the relationship between existing psychotherapies, the relationship between theory and practice, and highlights opportunities for new approaches to psychotherapy. Conflict of Interest Statement The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Pragmatism, naturalism, and phenomenology. Clinical, Experimental, and Theoretical Aspects.
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Conversion Disorder— Mind versus Body: A Review
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