Or, alternately, What does 'to be' mean? . the hermeneutic circle, and it has to do with the relation between. What is the difference between Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Interpretative . Gadamer and Ricoeur - though I suppose it depends on what you mean by. Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur are the foremost representatives of the movement of hermeneutic phenomenology. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutical.
Thus, bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to my experience of the tree, and specifically to the content or meaning in my experience. This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the experience. Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology, arguing over its results and its methods. And they were not alone. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology. In Being and Time Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology.
By contrast, Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation in a context of equipment and in being-with-others. Much of Being and Time develops an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, our being-toward-death.
In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture course called The Basic Problems of PhenomenologyHeidegger traced the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than systems of ideal truth as Husserl had held.
Our deep understanding of being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held. In the s phenomenology migrated from Austrian and then German philosophy into French philosophy. In the novel Nausea Jean-Paul Sartre described a bizarre course of experience in which the protagonist, writing in the first person, describes how ordinary objects lose their meaning until he encounters pure being at the foot of a chestnut tree, and in that moment recovers his sense of his own freedom.
In Being and Nothingnesswritten partly while a prisoner of warSartre developed his conception of phenomenological ontology. Consciousness is a consciousness of objects, as Husserl had stressed. The chestnut tree I see is, for Sartre, such a phenomenon in my consciousness. For Sartre, the practice of phenomenology proceeds by a deliberate reflection on the structure of consciousness. Sartre wrote many plays and novels and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty developed a rich variety of phenomenology emphasizing the role of the body in human experience. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty looked to experimental psychology, analyzing the reported experience of amputees who felt sensations in a phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty rejected both associationist psychology, focused on correlations between sensation and stimulus, and intellectualist psychology, focused on rational construction of the world in the mind.
Think of the behaviorist and computationalist models of mind in more recent decades of empirical psychology. For the body image is neither in the mental realm nor in the mechanical-physical realm. Rather, my body is, as it were, me in my engaged action with things I perceive including other people. The scope of Phenomenology of Perception is characteristic of the breadth of classical phenomenology, not least because Merleau-Ponty drew with generosity on Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre while fashioning his own innovative vision of phenomenology.
His phenomenology addressed the role of attention in the phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, the motility of the body, the body in sexual being and in speech, other selves, temporality, and the character of freedom so important in French existentialism.
In the years since Husserl, Heidegger, et al. Interpretation of historical texts by Husserl et al. Since the s, philosophers trained in the methods of analytic philosophy have also dug into the foundations of phenomenology, with an eye to 20th century work in philosophy of logic, language, and mind.
Analytic phenomenology picks up on that connection. For Frege, an expression refers to an object by way of a sense: For Husserl, similarly, an experience or act of consciousness intends or refers to an object by way of a noema or noematic sense: Indeed, for Husserl, the theory of intentionality is a generalization of the theory of linguistic reference: More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscovered phenomenological issues of mental representation, intentionality, consciousness, sensory experience, intentional content, and context-of-thought.
Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenological issues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies and mathematical modeling.
Such studies will extend the methods of traditional phenomenology as the Zeitgeist moves on. We address philosophy of mind below. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among others.
How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: Suppose phenomenology joins that list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field: Ontology is the study of beings or their being—what is.
Epistemology is the study of knowledge—how we know. Logic is the study of valid reasoning—how to reason. Ethics is the study of right and wrong—how we should act. Phenomenology is the study of our experience—how we experience. The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they seem to call for different methods of study. Historically it may be arguedSocrates and Plato put ethics first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then Descartes put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, and then Husserl in his later transcendental phase put phenomenology first.
As we saw, phenomenology helps to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest, according to modern epistemology. On the other hand, phenomenology itself claims to achieve knowledge about the nature of consciousness, a distinctive kind of first-person knowledge, through a form of intuition.
As we saw, logical theory of meaning led Husserl into the theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. On one account, phenomenology explicates the intentional or semantic force of ideal meanings, and propositional meanings are central to logical theory.
But logical structure is expressed in language, either ordinary language or symbolic languages like those of predicate logic or mathematics or computer systems. It remains an important issue of debate where and whether language shapes specific forms of experience thought, perception, emotion and their content or meaning. So there is an important if disputed relation between phenomenology and logico-linguistic theory, especially philosophical logic and philosophy of language as opposed to mathematical logic per se.
Phenomenology studies among other things the nature of consciousness, which is a central issue in metaphysics or ontology, and one that leads into the traditional mind-body problem. Husserlian methodology would bracket the question of the existence of the surrounding world, thereby separating phenomenology from the ontology of the world.
Phenomenology might play a role in ethics by offering analyses of the structure of will, valuing, happiness, and care for others in empathy and sympathy. Historically, though, ethics has been on the horizon of phenomenology. Husserl largely avoided ethics in his major works, though he featured the role of practical concerns in the structure of the life-world or of Geist spirit, or culture, as in Zeitgeistand he once delivered a course of lectures giving ethics like logic a basic place in philosophy, indicating the importance of the phenomenology of sympathy in grounding ethics.
Beauvoir sketched an existentialist ethics, and Sartre left unpublished notebooks on ethics. However, an explicitly phenomenological approach to ethics emerged in the works of Emannuel Levinas, a Lithuanian phenomenologist who heard Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg before moving to Paris. Allied with ethics are political and social philosophy.
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were politically engaged in s Paris, and their existential philosophies phenomenologically based suggest a political theory based in individual freedom. Sartre later sought an explicit blend of existentialism with Marxism.
Still, political theory has remained on the borders of phenomenology. Social theory, however, has been closer to phenomenology as such. Husserl analyzed the phenomenological structure of the life-world and Geist generally, including our role in social activity.
Heidegger stressed social practice, which he found more primordial than individual consciousness. Alfred Schutz developed a phenomenology of the social world. Sartre continued the phenomenological appraisal of the meaning of the other, the fundamental social formation. Moving outward from phenomenological issues, Michel Foucault studied the genesis and meaning of social institutions, from prisons to insane asylums.
Classical phenomenology, then, ties into certain areas of epistemology, logic, and ontology, and leads into parts of ethical, social, and political theory. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind It ought to be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the area called philosophy of mind.
Yet the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind have not been closely joined, despite overlapping areas of interest. So it is appropriate to close this survey of phenomenology by addressing philosophy of mind, one of the most vigorously debated areas in recent philosophy. The tradition of analytic philosophy began, early in the 20th century, with analyses of language, notably in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then in The Concept of Mind Gilbert Ryle developed a series of analyses of language about different mental states, including sensation, belief, and will.
Though Ryle is commonly deemed a philosopher of ordinary language, Ryle himself said The Concept of Mind could be called phenomenology. In effect, Ryle analyzed our phenomenological understanding of mental states as reflected in ordinary language about the mind. Centuries later, phenomenology would find, with Brentano and Husserl, that mental acts are characterized by consciousness and intentionality, while natural science would find that physical systems are characterized by mass and force, ultimately by gravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum fields.
Where do we find consciousness and intentionality in the quantum-electromagnetic-gravitational field that, by hypothesis, orders everything in the natural world in which we humans and our minds exist?
That is the mind-body problem today. In short, phenomenology by any other name lies at the heart of the contemporary mind-body problem. After Ryle, philosophers sought a more explicit and generally naturalistic ontology of mind. In the s materialism was argued anew, urging that mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system.
A stronger materialism holds, instead, that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state. But materialism does not fit comfortably with phenomenology. For it is not obvious how conscious mental states as we experience them—sensations, thoughts, emotions—can simply be the complex neural states that somehow subserve or implement them.
If mental states and neural states are simply identical, in token or in type, where in our scientific theory of mind does the phenomenology occur—is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? And yet experience is part of what is to be explained by neuroscience. In the late s and s the computer model of mind set in, and functionalism became the dominant model of mind.
On this model, mind is not what the brain consists in electrochemical transactions in neurons in vast complexes.
Instead, mind is what brains do: Thus, a mental state is a functional state of the brain or of the human or animal organism. More specifically, on a favorite variation of functionalism, the mind is a computing system: Since the s the cognitive sciences—from experimental studies of cognition to neuroscience—have tended toward a mix of materialism and functionalism. Gradually, however, philosophers found that phenomenological aspects of the mind pose problems for the functionalist paradigm too.
Many philosophers pressed the case that sensory qualia—what it is like to feel pain, to see red, etc. Consciousness has properties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to the brain. And, at some level of description, neural activities implement computation.
In the s John Searle argued in Intentionality and further in The Rediscovery of the Mind that intentionality and consciousness are essential properties of mental states. Searle also argued that computers simulate but do not have mental states characterized by intentionality. As Searle argued, a computer system has a syntax processing symbols of certain shapes but has no semantics the symbols lack meaning: In this way Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting that mind is a biological property of organisms like us: However, there is an important difference in background theory.
For Searle explicitly assumes the basic worldview of natural science, holding that consciousness is part of nature. But Husserl explicitly brackets that assumption, and later phenomenologists—including Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty—seem to seek a certain sanctuary for phenomenology beyond the natural sciences. And yet phenomenology itself should be largely neutral about further theories of how experience arises, notably from brain activity.
Since the late s, and especially the late s, a variety of writers working in philosophy of mind have focused on the fundamental character of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological issue. Does consciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, or consciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held in varying detail?
If so, then every act of consciousness either includes or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Does that self-consciousness take the form of an internal self-monitoring? If so, is that monitoring of a higher order, where each act of consciousness is joined by a further mental act monitoring the base act? Or is such monitoring of the same order as the base act, a proper part of the act without which the act would not be conscious? A variety of models of this self-consciousness have been developed, some explicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre.
Two recent collections address these issues: David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. The philosophy of mind may be factored into the following disciplines or ranges of theory relevant to mind: Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced, analyzing the structure—the types, intentional forms and meanings, dynamics, and certain enabling conditions—of perception, thought, imagination, emotion, and volition and action.
Neuroscience studies the neural activities that serve as biological substrate to the various types of mental activity, including conscious experience. Neuroscience will be framed by evolutionary biology explaining how neural phenomena evolved and ultimately by basic physics explaining how biological phenomena are grounded in physical phenomena.
Here lie the intricacies of the natural sciences. It is a disservice to unsuspecting students to hawk Moustakas' heuristics as an accepted research technique by misappropriation of the traditional, established term and by failing to be absolutely clear and up front that the term is being applied very narrowly and arbitrarily — totally unrelated to the accepted meaning — to a highly questionable technique that has yet to win any support of note outside its own very narrow self-promoting clique.
Whether I agree or disagree with the usefulness of the technique, I would have no criticism whatsoever were it presented in an open up-front manner, with an original, descriptive appellation and an initial qualifying statement that it is the sole invention of Clark Moustakas — perhaps elaborated on over the years by his colleagues and students — that has failed to gain notable support and recognition outside his immediate circle, but that it is believed by the Moustakas circle to have value and particular merit in some research questions for the reasons to be presented.
Students may then evaluate it on those terms and make up their own minds as to its viability. If I am mistaken in that impression, I remain unapologetic since surely the confusion cannot fail to be recognized by Moustakas et al.
Such minimalistic treatment has greatly distorted the real essence of phenomenology and hermeneutics, resulting in an over-simplistic view that has no valid philosophical framework or methodological orientation.
Without such framework and orientation, the research approaches presented in this seminar have no theoretical grounding, and therefore, no practical justification. Not only is there no justification for the approaches presented in this seminar, as will be demonstrated in the following section, but such a mimimalistic presentation greatly distorts the depth and breadth of hermeneutics and phenomenology.
As a sample of this depth and breadth, I have included an appendix of randomly accessed material that depicts some of the areas and concerns which phenomenology and hermeneutics have addressed, and some of the concepts that have been central to a very wide expanse of intellectual endeavor. The seminar went downhill from that point on.
The convener was listless and unenergetic throughout. Speaking in a dronelike monotone not much above a mumble, his manner was unenthusiastic and lacked any spark of vibrancy, authority, inspiration or passion. This was my first and hopefully only experience in encountering a convener or speaker for any event whose level of animation was not much more than that of a damp washcloth. It felt to me that to the convener the whole thing the seminar, that is was an onerous task that had to be endured and gotten through with the least amount of effort expended.
There was no direction or control; discussions and dialog went all over the place without any attempt on the part of the convener to bring content back Page 12 into focus or redirect discussion to the topic at hand. Off-the-wall questions were not only answered by the convener you can well imagine the kind of answer that was returned by the convenerbut expounded upon ad absurdum!!
In fact, the entire seminar seemed rambling, totally unstructured, unfocused and ill- prepared. From the onset, it was apparent to me that no one besides myself had done the readings, a fact that was confirmed in private talks with the individual participants.
As a doctoral-level seminar, one must expect, at the very least, that the preparatory material be well engaged by all the participants in order to have not only a meaningful, but at the doctoral level, a scholarly dialog. I personally take my doctoral work very seriously. Any compromise on program integrity is a negative reflection on the value of my work and my degree.
I view the Ph. D as the highest academic achievement from an institutionalized program of study. I view it as a scholarly pursuit reflecting a dedicated commitment to academic rigor. If the seminars are treated by The Union Institute as mere fluff to simply acquire the requisite number of residency days to fulfill accreditation requirements, then I would challenge the legitimacy of The Union Institute program.
If, on the other hand, the seminars are regarded as serious scholarly endeavors, there is no excuse for coming to a seminar unprepared, neither on the part of the convener nor on the part of the participant. Anyone unprepared should not be allowed to attend, or not be given credit for the seminar. If such regulations are not enforced, then the seminar program is a sham and The Union Institute Ph. D degree is flawed, if not worthless. In my two other Union Institute seminars, the situation was dramatically different.
Both featured rich, scholarly content with highly involved and focussed participants, demonstrating a preparation that evidenced significant engagement with the reading assignments. In one of the seminars, a paper had to be submitted prior to attendance in order to receive credit for the seminar.
This helped ensure the requisite level of engagement with the materials. In these two other seminars, the dialog, discussions, and questions from the participants were focussed, topically orientated, and evidenced knowledge and thoughtful consideration of the issues borne out in the corpus.
The conveners were thoroughly versed in the seminar subject, were animated, enthusiastic, and vibrant lecturers and gave comprehensive, detailed, highly logical and organized articulate and interesting presentations. For me, what made these seminars worthwhile, was not only how well-prepared and organized they were, and the enthusiasm and expertise of the conveners, but also, they presented all sides of the subject, including those arguments that addressed the very legitimacy of many of the main tenets of the subject itself.
The result was a stimulating debate on the issues and a balanced view of the subject matter Sharpe ; Sigman Page 13 Getting back to the present seminar under review, I labored to some extent in the first section of this paper to expose some deadly flaws in the concepts and underlying issues of the subject matter of this seminar as presented in the syllabus, reading list and related materials.
The problems cited in those materials were manifestly evident in the actual presentation.
Indeed, the presentation confirmed for me that the convener did not have a clear grasp of the material that he had included in the reading list. He maintained that introspection is inevitably predisposed and biased. Moreover, our very use of language to describe our experience transforms the experience. For instance, by describing an experience, we have transformed that experience into certain feelings and impressions that were introduced by the choice of words that were used -- such feelings and impressions may or may not have been constituted in the original experience, or may represent a subtle change in the original impression that belies the nature of the actual experience.
Such an approach is totally naive and impossible. Much of that worldview, and indeed, personality itself, is hardwired, based on our own unique disposition of the mechanisms of vision, hearing, smell, touch and all other sense organs; physiological functioning; neuronal activity; and all other physical and biological properties that affect to what extent we are able to perceive various stimuli; how such stimuli is processed and internalized into levels of awareness; and intellectual proclivities; that, together, make each of us unique in our abilities, motivations, desires, styles of communication, emotional responsiveness, etc.
Our essence is composed of worldview-phenotype-personality with a constant interaction with the environment in an ongoing dynamic that modifies our worldview moment to moment at a microsubstratum below the level of awareness. The billions of sensory inputs that are constantly being processed into patterns of information by the brain to form impressions and build logical constructs, mental images and schemas and personal knowledge databases, are so vast and complex, that they swamp and totally overwhelm the conscious mind.
If such microsubstratum activities were conscious, all concentration would be totally absorbed in analyzing how each microstimulus is processed and internalized — and we would starve to death dwelling on the sensations and impressions of being hungry rather than forming a broad perception of the world that would enable our interaction with that world to obtain nourishment.
Although we pride ourselves on our scientific, intellectual, and technological accomplishments, much of human functioning and understanding is noncerebral, subconscious, or automatic. By attempting to explain human experience and conscious behavior while denying major components of that experience and ignoring the fact that much of what is being investigated is simply unknowable, phenomenology and Moustakas' heuristic method even more so can only be viewed from a scientific orientation as inherently flawed and bogus for a discussion on the prevailing definition of science and the scientific method, see Robinson Which side of the debate one is on is irrelevant, but what the convener fails to point out, is that the methods and techniques presented in this seminar are unscientific by definition ibid.
Whether by intention or lack of knowledge, the convener has portrayed Dilthey as legitimatizing subjective qualitative research methodology as a valid scientific endeavor, where in fact, he strongly felt the opposite. That is why he proposed hermeneutics be broadened from pure literary analysis to a method for the human sciences so that the artifacts or text of human consciousness rather than human consciousness itself was the object of study since he felt that human consciousness could never be fully known and was not a valid realm of research.
He proposed to structure a hermeneutic methodology that though delved into a limited personal perspective, maintained a rigid scientific objectivity. The hermeneutic approach was transmogrified through the philosophical concept of verstehen and the different ways of understanding, including nondiscursive understanding and the reaching of understanding through an initial tacit understanding which, through the hermeneutic circle, evolves into a more definitive comprehension until a level of acceptable verstehen is reached.
When exercising a skill we literally dwell in the innumerable muscular acts which contribute to its purpose, a purpose which constitutes their joint meaning. Equally problematic, there is absolutely no logical relationship whatsoever between a skill and the presumed focus on its underlying constituent muscular activity, and the conclusion that all understanding is tacit understanding! The conclusion is a complete non sequitur.
Page 16 But be that as it may, whatever logical faults there may be in the literature, I at least wanted to resolve the contradictions between the literature and the presentation. Not wishing to openly challenge or confront the convener, I waited until a break and approached the convener privately about the discrepancies between his presentation and the literature.
He acted like it was some sort of incomprehensible artifact from the deepest reaches of the unchartered realms of the cosmos. He refused to engage me in a discussion on that topic or any other.
The only possible conclusion that I could draw from this reaction, was that he was simply either not very well acquainted with the subject matter, or was not able to fully digest and understand the material, or some combination thereof. I am not nitpicking, as there were severe flaws in the presentation throughout the seminar and each time I tried to engage the convener in an intellectual discussion or even a simple clarification, I was met with the same vacuous look and lack of response.
When the convener was introducing the topic of intentionality I asked him to please explain the difference between intentionality and the concept intensionality as presented by Husserl, Heidegger, R. Laing and other philosophical phenomenologists and existentialists, and how intensionality, a fundamental component of an individual experiential frame of reference, was deemphasized, or ignored as the technique of phenomenological reduction evolved in phenomenological psychology directly from the Husserl tradition.
The convener responded that the term intensionality was not known to him, confirming my suspicion of his particularly narrow engagement with the corpus.
The technique imaginative variation was portrayed in this seminar as a process by which an experience is described by a subject and broken down by the researcher into specific invariant themes or components which are then each envisioned in different imaginative settings by the researcher, revealing deeper, enhanced and expanded insights on each of those themes that together constitute the essence of the experience under investigation.
However, at least historically, and in phenomenological psychology, the literature defines imaginative variation entirely differently. Husserl was the first to define a technique referred to as free imaginative variation.
Hermeneutics and Phenomenology
With each addition or deletion, the researcher questions whether the amended description still describes an example of the same kind of object or phenomenon as that which the original example was said to exemplify. Sometimes when a predicate is added or deleted from the description, what remains is a description of a different kind of phenomenon from the original.
At other times, the additions and deletions do not affect the essential features of the kind of phenomenon exemplified by the different examples.
Through this process of mental experimentation, the necessary and invariant features, the identical core of meaning or essence of the original phenomenon, become apparent and can be distinguished from features that are accidental and hence irrelevant to the eidetic description. Polkinghorne44 Husserl proposed two basic approaches to the study of human experience. One, the method of free variation, leads to the description of invariant or essential structures.
However, the search for essential structures differs from the process through which biologists establish taxonomic categories based on anatomical similarities. Further, rather than have the researcher drift into a series of elaborate, anything-goes, freewheeling random imaginings, as actually portrayed by example in the seminar, the free variation approach defined by Husserl is a Page 18 highly methodical process that adds and deletes predicates within a description of an experience until the experience is changed, identifying all those predicates that are the fundamental constituents of the experience, and disregarding the rest.
This definition by Husserl forms the basis of imaginative variation as practiced in phenomenological psychology. We ask ourselves, can we imagine color extended in space over 10 m2? Can we imagine color extended in space over 10 cm2? Method This method is a kind of disciplined asceticism of interpretation. It strives to discover internal essences through reductions of phenomena of experience to the essential elements of experience. It involves several tasks. To do this, we need to enlarge our range of experience as much as possible.
We need to intuit through all of these activities what the essence of the thing under investgation is, what makes it essentially itself, by searching for the most general features of which the specific characteristics we see in the object of investigation are instances.
We need freely and imaginatively to vary the components of the phenomena being studied in order to determine which are their essential, and which their conditional, features; in this way we can detect what the essential relations between the things under consideration.
When these essential predicates have been identified of human being, for examplethen we have immediate unmediatedapodicitic knowledge. This is used to create a world of ideas eidoiwhich is a universal and so public world. But are these descriptions true? By correlating the results of the phenomenological reduction pure experiences with the results of the eidetic reduction essential essencesa public world can be reconstructed.
This account includes an interpretation of how human thinking connects with the public wrld and so premits true statements to be made. Note that phenomenological descriptions are not true because we observe them to be so, but rather because they are first directly intuited and then confirmed through their use in relating whole ranges of different phenomena both real and imaginative to particular instances of our experience. Here we see the phenomenological hermeneutical circle: For example, anything that shows up as a human has rational capacities, yet we identify the nature and meaning of rationality by looking at human beings.
Husserl argued that the hermeneutical circle is not vicious, but a part of life, and we can still reach intuitive knowledge of essences in spite of it. In fact, the relative virtues and deficits of continental philosophy after Descartes and Anglo-American philosophy after Locke reflect each other in the same way. Continental philosophy typically begins with the internal world of the self, which is almost impossibly difficult to talk about, but which may be the most important topic for philosophical reflection.
It will even sacrifice clarity to achieve some grasp on this most important of topics.
Phenomenology Online » Hermeneutical Phenomenology
By contrast, Anglo-American philosophy, especially in its analytical and linguistic forms, begins with the external world of nature and thinks of human beings as part of that nature.
The external world of nature can be discussed with great precision but this emphasis risks mimizing or even overlooking the importance of the human world, even to the point in extreme cases of denying that there is an internal world of self-consciousness. Again, his strength lies in his ability to force-think his way from the internal, private world to the external, public world; his weakness in so heavy a reliance on a hermeneutical circle to the point that common sense aspects of public life can only be taked about after an excruciatingly extended period of expenditure of prodigious effort on the phenomenological method.
Pictures of Heidegger are here as a younger manhere as an older manand here on the right with Gadamer. A picture of the title page of Sein und Seit can be seen here. Born in Messkirch, Baden, s. Germany, son of a Catholic sexton Constance, then Freiburg Begins to read Husserl. Marriage to Elfride Petri Professor of philosophy, Univ.
Publication of Sein und Zeit Being and Time Appointed to chair of philosophy, Univ. Elected Rector of Freiburg. Ends lectures with "Heil Hitler. Argues that philosophy can only be done in the German language or, at a pinch, in Greek and that Germany is the only possible successor to the Greek tradition. Very well connected politically. Briefly serves with Volkssturm Home Guard Lectures at Freiburg and in France.
Thought reaches height of popularity in France, influencing Sartre, existentialist movement Dies in Freiburg Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Being and Time Essay, censored by Nazis because of treatment of humanism What is Called Thinking? Was ist das--die Philosophie? Unterwegs zur Sprache On the Way to Language. Zur Sache des Denkens. The Heideggerian "apologias" have been, however, widely utilized. Konradihaus, grammar school in Constance. Educated in Greek, Latin.
Simultaneously enters theological seminary and university at Freiburg. Studies mathematics and natural science for a period, but increasing focus on philosophy. Attends lectures of Rickert. Husserl appointed to chair of philosophy at Freiburg.
Professor, - There was some hesitancy to offer position to Heidegger because of lack of publications. Full Professor, Fall, Spring, publication of Sein und Zeit. Dedicated to Husserl dedication dropped in ed. Professor, University of Freiburg: Documentary evidence contradicts this Ott.
Elected Rector of University of Freiburg. Legally subject to individual state government; but state generally did not interfere with internal university affairs. Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany.