Ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

Pentecostal beliefs and practices also are changing the way many of Brazil's Catholics practice their faith. . Outside of the Orthodox Church, Protestants constitute the largest Nigeria's Muslim population is nearly equal to its Christian . Because of the ambiguous, and sometimes adversarial, relationship . Since its independence in , Nigeria has struggled unsuccessfully In spite of the apparent dominance of Islam and Christianity in public relations, the the transformation of state–religion relations among them will show how their . the objective of which was to promote peculiar regional tendencies. The presentation gives a brief overview of religious education in Nigerian public schools as it However, Yorubas in the south-west are both Muslims and Christians with Muslims slightly in the majority and there is a fair amount of inter- marriage. . The way of teaching Islam and Christianity in Nigeria is expected to be.

Additionally, a substantial number of Catholics worship in unregistered congregations that refuse to join the Patriotic Catholic Association. A main point of contention is that the Association operates independently from Rome; for instance, it appoints bishops without the approval of the pope.

This is because there are few specific laws that clearly establish the limits and freedoms of religious groups in society. Of these, roughly 9 million 0. The exact number of Catholics in unregistered congregations is difficult to estimate because there may be double counting in some Catholic dioceses where churches and bishops are affiliated with both the official and unofficial churches.

Christians affiliated with the state-approved Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement number roughly 23 million 1.

ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

This study estimates that an additional 35 million Christians in China 2. Additionally, there are small populations of Orthodox Christians and other Christians, some of whom are expatriates. The general consensus among scholars of religion in China is that Christianity has grown substantially during the past three decades.

Regional Distribution of Christians | Pew Research Center

Additional information on the religious situation in China is included in Appendix C: Methodolgy for China [PDF]. Indeed, the Philippines has the largest Christian population outside of the Americas and Europe. It also has the third-largest Catholic population in the world at about 76 millionbehind Brazil and Mexico and slightly ahead of the U. See table in Catholic.

ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

Roman Catholic priests and missionaries began arriving in the Philippines in the 16th and 17th centuries, around the time of the Spanish conquest of the country. The church steadily gained adherents over the centuries. Bynearly three-quarters of the population professed Roman Catholicism. The first Filipino bishop was consecrated inand the first Filipino cardinal in Though overwhelmingly Catholic, the Christian population of the Philippines also includes a significant number of Protestants.

The largest and most visible charismatic Catholic organization in the Philippines is El Shaddai, under the leadership of a layperson, Mike Velarde. One of the largest non- Protestant Christian groups in the country is the Church of Christ Iglesia ni Cristoa non-Trinitarian indigenous church founded in A Country Survey of Pentecostals Wiegele, Investing in Miracles: Although Christianity began in this region, it now has the lowest overall number of Christians and the smallest share of its population that is Christian.

Christians are a minority in every country in the region. The study finds that there are 4. Nine-in-ten Egyptian Christians are Orthodox Christian. In each of the eight subsequent censuses, the Christian share of the population gradually shrank. Religion was, therefore, a cornerstone of Yoruba politics. State—Religion Relations in Pre-Colonial Igbo Communities Politically and socially, the traditional Igbo society had no centralized form of government, 17 except in kingdoms such as those of the Nri, Arochukwu, Agbor, and Onitsha.

The elders at all the identified levels of government played a prominent role as the holders of authority, though they did not act alone. Whereas the people were highly religious, politics in Igboland was not completely dominated by religious bias, although religion played an important role in communal relations. The Igbo are, and have always been, a profoundly religious people who believe in a supreme creator, known as Chukwu.

According to oral traditions, Chukwu created the visible universe uwa 22 and everything in it, but dwells in the sky with a host of powerful divinities and primordial beings. These gods or spirits are known as Alusi, alternatively known as Arusi or Arushi depending on dialect. The role of the diviners was to interpret the wishes of the Alusi, while the role of the priest was to placate them with sacrifices.

They were also in charge of oracles, whose declarations were final in certain disputes. Thus, in terms of the relationship between politics and religion, the Igbo society differed significantly from the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba societies, as religion and its personalities were merely accorded some privileges and respect in the decision-making process.

Though relevant to social organization in Igboland, religion was dominant at the family level due to the diversity in worship and subscription to diverse minor divinities. There were three regions northern, eastern, and western and the Federal Capital Territory. The northern region particularly championed a policy of regionalism, which was essentially aimed at weakening the centre and strengthening the regions, the objective of which was to promote peculiar regional tendencies, particularly adherence to Islamic law.

In spite of the relative regional autonomy, the legal system was unified and cast in a constitutional framework which gave pre-eminence to the secular legal order, while subjecting all other laws to the unified control of the secular federal Supreme Court and, ultimately, the Crown. Accordingly, the judicial structure that was adopted during the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates in was retained with modification.

There was a Federal Supreme Court, which was presided over by a Chief Justice of the Federation, while each region then northern, eastern, and western regions had a high court presided over by a Chief Justice.

Appeals from each of the high courts of the regions went to the Federal Supreme Court, while appeals from Magistrate Courts, Customary or Native Courts Grade A went to the regional high courts. Although customary law was still applicable in secular courts, its legitimacy was contingent upon the validity test established by the Native Courts Proclamation of Similarly, although a Sharia Court of Appeal was established for the northern region, by Section of the Constitution, appeals from the Sharia Court of Appeal lay before the Federal Supreme Court—which was a secular court, established under Section of the Constitution.

In terms of the sources of Nigerian law, the common law of England, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application, applicable to Nigeria beforewere to be administered in the courts in so far as local circumstances permitted. Thus three sources of law were applicable in Nigeria courts—English law, customary law, and sharia law—although sharia law was considered by the British as part of customary law.

On the other hand, the contradictions inherent in the very nature of Islamic law and political theory 36 predictably generated serious resistance from northern Muslims, who saw secularity and secular institutions as atheistic and against the very foundation of Islam.

Although the conflict between Islamic legal and political values and the Western colonial principles was tolerated by the northern establishment under colonialism, these contradictions became relevant shortly after independence. The conflict between Islamic and secular law in northern Nigeria was in place before independence.

The colonial native courts in the region, which were in most cases presided over by Alkalis local judges who applied Islamic lawhad their decisions sometimes quashed on appeal to the regional high courts on the basis of repugnancy.

Before the West Africa Court of Appeal, the conviction was quashed and the sentence set aside.

Global Christianity - A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population

In the opinion of the court, whenever a native court tries any person for any offence defined in the Criminal Code, it is bound to follow the Code to the exclusion of Islamic law or native law and custom. Similarly, in Maizabo v Sokoto Native Authority 41 it was held that though a native court had power to try a case under native law and custom—Islamic law then considered as native law, it could not impose a sentence higher than what the accused would have received had his case been tried under the provisions of the criminal code.

Thus the British bequeathed to a unified Nigeria a seemingly secular system of government, albeit with deeply segmented religious cleavages, reflected in its institutional configuration. Several factors underlie the resistance of northern Muslims to secularism after independence. As noted earlier, the British colonialists themselves sought to protect this political and legal order for reasons of imperial convenience, until it became obvious that an Islamic legal order would not serve the commercial interest of Western merchants, particularly after independence.

Unfortunately for Britain, its change of mind at the twilight of colonialism was too little too late, as the sudden introduction of Western secularism introduced a contradiction that would challenge the Islamic way of life and, therefore sow a seed of instability in the new state.

This is because Islam under sharia is conceived by Muslims as an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic life of Muslims, and even more. An emergent secular regime that sought to separate religion from state affairs was therefore problematic to the northern oligarchs, who were accustomed to the fusion of political, economic, and spiritual roles under an Islamic regime.

As demonstrated below, this contradiction is clearly and consistently asserted by Nigerian Muslims in their quest for an Islamic political and legal order. Islam does not admit a narrow view of religion by restricting it within the limits of worship, specific rituals and spiritual beliefs. In its precise meaning, Islam is not only a religion; it is also a way of life that regulates all the aspects of life on the scale of the individual and the nation.

Islam is a social order, philosophy of life, a system of economic rules and government. A Christian for instance may be prepared, in the notion of giving to Caesar and God what respectively belong to them, to limit his right to religious freedom to matters of faith and worship only. A person from the West may also be contented with the western compartmentalization of life into religious and temporal. This is because his spiritual and moral worth is tested against his daily interaction with others at the congregational prayers, in marital union, in the pursuit of his legitimate livelihood and in the holding of public responsibilities, amongst others.

Second, northern Muslims have had an obstinate adherence to the traditional philosophy of power and leadership that existed in pre-independence caliphate, a philosophy that associated governance with rulership in the traditional mould of the caliphatorial oligarchy.

Accordingly, the transition from an Anglo-Fulani colonial northern government to a modern democratic Nigeria based on egalitarianism came to the northern oligarchy as a rude shock. This political jolt was essentially based on a previous perception of power as an exclusive preserve of the emirs and the nobles, as well as the reality of a new nation that sought to create a distinction between political and religious authority.

Consequently, when the new class of northern oligarchs engaged in political activities, it did so within the limits of the concept of power in Hausa society, a concept guided by a hierarchically stratified society, with the emir at the top. Given that the social organization of the caliphate recognized the fusion of political and religious authority, the post-colonial Hausa-Fulani political elite continued, albeit informally, to associate religion with politics in the new political order, thereby creating an unhealthy tradition of politicizing religion and instrumentalizing it for political mobilization.

Under the new political dispensation, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, a caliphatorial prince, became the premier of the northern region, the de jure political leader of northern Nigeria, while the Sultan of Sokoto remained the de facto leader of the Muslim community in the north. This unorthodox arrangement, by caliphatorial standards, created a gulf between the two personalities, as Islam hitherto provided political legitimacy to the political leader in the caliphate.

This motivation led him into an ambitious Islamization campaign in the region and beyond, he allied with the Arab Islamic world in the process, attracting praise from that region as a champion of Islam and drawing millions of dollars from there in support of the faith in Nigeria. In addition, the Islamic faith became a source of political patronage. For northern Nigerians, therefore, attainment of political power as well as advancement in the Public Service and the Military were intricately tied to Islam and association with the faith.

Thus de jure, religion was separated from politics, but de facto, it remained a veritable source of political legitimacy in the north before the end of the first republic.

Between Secularity and Spirituality: Situating the Nigerian State A. The terms secularity and secularism have undergone intense scrutiny by various scholars, institutions, or groups seeking to conceptualize distinctions and impose definitions on the terms. Although scholars have established a distinction between secularity and secularism, these concepts are commonly regarded as meaning the same thing: The words derive from the Latin, saeculum, which means both this age and this world, and combines a spatial sense and a temporal sense.

In the Middle Ages, secular referred to priests who worked out in the world of local parishes, as opposed to priests who took vows of poverty and secluded themselves in monastic communities. In all of these instances, the secular indicates a distancing from the sacred, the eternal, and the otherworldly.

In the centuries that followed the secular began to separate itself from religious authority. In terms of typologies, the soft and hard correspondingly moderate and strict variants of secularity and secularism have been identified. Kosmin used the historical divergence between the French and American revolutions to construct the theoretical divergence between soft and hard secularism.

According to him, the French revolution, which was anchored on a joint struggle against despotism, religion, the monarchy, and the Roman Catholic Church ie the French Jacobin traditionwas unreservedly antagonistic to religion and therefore promoted atheism. In fact, the majority are liberal religionists. For the soft secularist, religion is properly a private lifestyle option, which must not threaten liberty and social harmony in a differentiated and pluralistic society.

On the other hand, soft secularism safeguards guarantee the right to freedom of worship and religion to all persons, both leaders and the led, thereby protecting the rights of religious minorities. Such a soft secularism, therefore, seeks to significantly reduce religious influence in public life, while at the same time guaranteeing freedom of religion and conscience to individuals and groups in the private realm.

A nation state could therefore adopt the hard strict variant of secularism or the soft moderate form. Nevertheless, in such systems religious symbols and connotations are commonly used in public institutions, while religious beliefs are widely considered a relevant part of the political discourse in many of these countries.

ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

This is true of the United States, for instance, where religious sentiments are brought to bear on issues of abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, etc. Thus even the soft or moderate conception of secularism is vehemently opposed by religious organizations as a threat to spirituality and a gradual recession to atheism.

ways of promoting christian muslim relationship in nigeria the outside wife

Accordingly, a middle-of-the-road approach which seeks the limited integration of religion into the public realm what I refer to as moderate or concessional secularism 63 is hereby suggested as the most appropriate strategy. Is Nigeria a Secular State? Anyone saying Nigeria is a secular nation does not understand the meaning of the word secular. There is nothing secular about the Nigerian nation since whatever we do will always put Islam and Christianity in the fore front.

On the one hand, the Nigerian Christian community, particularly its leadership, has consistently held the view that the divine state has universally given way to the secular state, where the temporal secular ruler enjoys full autonomy as ruler with no control from religious or spiritual authorities.

If you want to bring religion in, let it be after office hours. It seeks to undermine Islamic values, supplant the Islamic laws with those of its own and deface the sanctity of the Muslim society. Afterwards, an evaluation of these laws is made against the de facto relationship between religion and the state.